NACs). Methods of interaction are analysed in line with the Bank's established structures of funding, dialogue, partnering and networks. Third, the paper discusses the problems inherent within processes of engagement, the application of ownership at local government level, and the prevailing views of the community groups and NGOs that participated in research. Fourth, the discussion qualifies such opinions within the interests of these groups, the contentions within their arguments, and the Bank-proposed solutions to problems with the MAP. The paper then draws together its main findings as to what the implementation of the MAP reveals about the effectiveness and issues involved with delivery of Goal 6, its ability to reach people affected by poverty, and the impact it has on well-being.
HIV/AIDS, the World Bank and Goal 6
Understandings of the World Bank's role in public health have shifted from the mapping of the relationship between the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and early 1990s (Loewenson, 1995) to critically engage with how Bank policy and practice is influencing the global health agenda. The introduction of user fees and mechanisms of privatisation during the 1980s gave rise to the emergence of the Bank's 'top-down' style of health policy reform that favours a pluralistic style of implementation and delivery of healthcare services (Lee and Goodman, 2002; Owoh, 1996) . According to Buse, the World Bank's role in healthcare has grown exponentially since 1969 as the World Health Organisation has become institutionally marred by negative publicity and a lack of organisational direction (Buse, 1994) . What has occurred within this process has been the reduction of state financing and state provision for key aspects of the population and a rise in privatised service delivery as a perceivably more effective way of addressing health concerns (Gilson et al, 1994; Lorgen, 1998; Owoh, 1996) .
The use of multiple actors within healthcare provision has been acutely felt at the community grassroot where public policy initiatives seek to strengthen familial and community structures that care for the sick. The tendency towards community provision is not specific to public health, but has been a constant within development policy and planning over the last ten years. Specifically within the Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and model of communitydriven development.
The practice of community delivery and how it is organised however rests on the state structures. It also necessitates a certain level of institutional infrastructure for delivery, feedback and monitoring. As this paper will show, in practice community engagement within healthcare provision, is bounded within service delivery and a lack of reciprocity in terms of decision-making and the input of local ideas. The need for state structures of funding and feedback, the Washington-based dynamic to decision-making and agenda setting, and the lack of community consultation all limit the responsiveness of people living with and affected by HIV/AIDS. This becomes particularly significant to Goal 6. The UN's commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases has thus far been addressed through financial means. A significant part of the US$10billion that is channelled to the fight against HIV/AIDS is directed to community groups. The logic being that the epidemic targets and spreads through communities, provision is based at the community, so prevention, treatment and care interventions should target local activity. However, as the MAP indicates, processes of getting the money to the community, what happens when it is there, and the structures and directives initiated by the Bank to do so make this initiative problematic.
Methods of Community Engagement: '1000 Flowers Bloom'
The methods of community engagement used by the Bank through the MAP fit within a particular interpretation of community-driven development, rooted in the idea that communities are best placed to generate projects and ideas for policy as they can identify the main issues and means to address them. The inclusion of community groups within its HIV/AIDS policies reflects a wider trend in community inclusion in issues of public health that has long been recognised within health policy literature.
i The MAP has no clear objectives or criteria which community groups must fulfil, other than an overall strategy to direct funds to a vast array of groups so as to cover all aspects of the response and encourage an upsurge in community participation. Key to this was the community's ability to hold their governments to account for how they addressed HIV/AIDS. Each of the three countries explored within this paper have a specific community project: the HIV/AIDS Community Initiative in Kenya; the Community Action Fund (CAF) in Tanzania; and the Community HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) in Uganda (World Bank, 2000a; World Bank, 2000b; World Bank, 2000c; World Bank, 2000d; World Bank, 2000e; World Bank, 2003a; World Bank, 2003b; World Bank, 2003c; World Bank, 2003d) . Each of these projects uses funding, dialogue, and networking as the main method of community-driven development.
Key to these methods is the District AIDS Councils (DACs).
The District AIDS Councils (DACs)
Access, funding, and feedback from community groups to the Bank occur within a decentralised governance structure through the DACs. These agencies function as the intermediaries between the community and the centralised government NACs, and in some Interviews with community groups suggest that the majority of funding disbursed to the community is for training programmes. Training occurs from the top down. Community groups are trained in home based care, counselling, peer education, and basic methods of prevention of mother to child transmission by INGOs and NGOs. The community groups then utilise these skills to train and 'sensitise' other members of the community.
ii The result is that most community activity focuses on training, whilst issues of delivery in health services, education, and psycho-social support remain unfulfilled.
Feedback and Dialogue
Dialogue is the second form engagement takes at the community level. The Bank engages in dialogue through the decentralised NAC/DAC system and community visits. There are three central forms of community feedback and dialogue. The first is through the submission of quarterly reports from MAP sponsored community groups to the DACs.
Second, quarterly meetings are held within the District in which recipients of MAP funds discuss their activities, the problems in implementation, and put questions to the DACs.
Third, through joint planning meetings and operations. The groups partnered by the DACs are notably national or international NGO representatives such as TASO in Uganda and
World Vision (Harman, 2005g) , and the heads of particular community-based networks that prove their utility through longevity and direct links to the community. Bank representatives -nominally Task Team Leaders of the project (TTLs) -visit communities quarterly.
Unstructured forms of dialogue occur through Bank TTL quarterly visits to different community groups, and ad hoc partnerships such as a representative issuing awards at a football tournament designed to educate young people about HIV/AIDS (Harman, 2005c) .
Of the community groups interviewed none had engaged in unstructured dialogue (dialogue that was not report-writing) with the Bank.
Networks
The final form engagement takes at the community level is networking. The utility of networks as a means of influencing decision-making has been recognised by some community groups (Harman, 2006a; Harman, 2006b ). Groups at the community level stress their wider interactions through joint referrals, combining services, and mutual stakeholder meetings as a way of demonstrating their efficacy and thus securing greater funding from donors (Harman, 2005e; Harman, 2005h; Harman, 2006c; Harman, 2006d) . Networks of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) are on the increase, and are often linked with their national counterparts. However, the issues of distrust and issues of who or which organisation represents who are less clear at the community level where the greater concern is in regard to greater care and treatment of the sick (Harman, 2005i) . Networks at this level are thus less to do with influence upon decision-making and more involved with efficiency in delivery of services.
Problems and Contradictions of World Bank-Community Engagement
Effective CSO engagement that facilitates community empowerment and widespread provision of services is a theme evident in discussions with World Bank or government representatives, but is less so in discussion with community groups. The majority of community groups interviewed remarked on the problems with funding, the lack of feedback to and interest by donors, and the problems with the DACs and NACs. Each of these factors was seen as significant limitations to their ability to influence decision-making and formulate their overall mandate within Goal 6. This section addresses each of these problems in turn.
Funding and the DACs
Community opinion suggests the central obstacle to effective engagement has been the short-term nature of funding. Funding is too little, too late (Harman, 2005g; Harman, 2005h) . Community groups sponsored under the MAP often end up with operational projects but no funds to continue to support them beyond their first year of operations. The mass sensitisation work conducted under the MAP has led to community awareness that the money is there, but the general perception is that the money has not reached the community (Harman, 2005j; Harman, 2006b; Harman 2006f ). This issue presented the main concern of the community groups interviewed: where money from donors and the government goes.
Community groups offer two explanations as to why the money is not reaching them. The first is the presence of 'briefcase NGOs' that present high standard proposals, receive the money and then disappear (Harman, 2005k; Harman, 2005l; Harman, 2005m; Harman, 2006f; Harman, 2006h; Harman 2006i) . The second explanation is failure of the DACs to be transparent and accountable to those organisations they engage with. Communities funded under the MAP are sometimes unclear about the disbursement process at the District level.
They do not feel represented by the DACs and do not see a clear feedback structure from their report-writing, questionnaires or community visits (Harman, 2006j) . Community groups see funding access and dialogue as dependent on knowing 'the tricks of getting the money' and having 'someone who will push for you' (Harman, 2005n) . CSOs have to establish relationships at every level of decentralised government to achieve any outcome from their engagement (Harman, 2006k (Harman, 2006l) . The majority of donors treat it as a grey area open to interpretation at the local level (Harman, 2006m) . This is a barrier to effective community empowerment as the money paid to the DACs under allowances often comes directly from funds earmarked for community delivery, which in turn restricts the budget for community visits and direct engagement (Harman, 2006l) .
Capacity and the DACs
Allowances are representative of the wider issue of limited institutional and financial capacity of the DACs. The emphasis upon rapid disbursement under the MAP led to the DACs being established with little understanding of the issues, mechanisms of governance, community engagement or training to address these gaps in knowledge. Management and disbursal of funds leaves minimal time and ability to co-ordinate activities within the District, the DACs central role (Harman, 2006n) . The burden of managing multiple community groups and different donors on the DACs results in the slow disbursal of funds and a lack of absorptive capacity within the communities themselves (Harman, 2006o) .
The relationship between problems in funding mechanisms and the DACs are underpinned by a contradiction between ownership and conditionality. DAC staff members in all the countries considered acknowledge the influence of the MAP and World Bank priorities, yet reiterate ownership of the project. However, the DACs did not exist prior to the MAP.
District HIV/AIDS work plans are designed in partnership with the NACs under the guidelines of each specific national strategic plan (Harman, 2005o ) that represent the key principles of the MAP in each of the three countries studied. The DACs resisted CSO involvement, but had to agree to a CSO component of the District HIV/AIDS work plan in order to receive any funds. MAP funds earmarked to 'familiarise' DAC staff with the concept, was in effect training to teach them the 'operationalisation of a multi-sectoral approach' (Harman, 2005g ). As such, every level of DAC-CSO engagement is 'determined by the centre' (Harman, 2005g) , leaving minimal space for community and government input into the direction and implementation of the project.
The Bank
Community viewpoints on the Bank itself are limited to non-existent (Harman, 2006b ).
Those aware of the Bank's involvement in HIV/AIDS have a pragmatic view that their intentions were good but 'their hands are tied due to the size of the project/policy and the 'through -through -through structures'' (Harman, 2005n; Harman, 2006p) . Community groups are more critical when discussing the MAP and its 'owners', the NACs, than the Bank. Many of the groups that took part in research do not feel the presence of the MAP at the community level and believe the majority of activity to be conducted by other donors (Harman, 2005n; Harman, 2005p; Harman, 2005q; Harman, 2005r; Harman, 2006q) . Despite contributing to the capacity of smaller organisations, the community component of the MAP is viewed as unsustainable (Harman, 2005c; Harman, 2005i ).
The problems and perceptions underpinning CSO engagement have negative ramifications for communities affected by HIV/AIDS. Blockages in funding channels caused by bureaucracy, limitations in institutional capacity and questions of ownership reduce the amount of money, education and support for people living with HIV/AIDS. In separating decision-making and implementation whilst maintaining government ownership of the project, communities are unable to address these issues. There is, however, a need to qualify such criticisms with a critical assessment of how these problems relate to the community groups themselves, compared to the experience with other donors, and reflect wider issues within development delivery.
Assessing the Problems and Perceptions of Community Groups
The problems with engagement identified by the community groups that participated in research need to be offset by a deeper assessment of the issues these problems pose and the Bank's response to them. Issues over funding, bureaucracy, and leverage are often based upon community group perception. This is evident in three ways. The first is in relation to the short-term nature and lack of evidence of funding. The US$10billion annually directed to HIV/AIDS relief, and the existence of multiple CSO activity suggests there is an abundance of funding. Often those groups that flagged the issue of funding had received money from the MAP and were submitting proposals to other donors. One of the main interests of community groups working in HIV/AIDS is to secure funds for their projects, and thus compete with other groups, and stress the need for more funding in line with their own interests. The issue of funding is pertinent for all community groups involved in research;
however, problems associated with allocation and disbursement may be over-emphasised.
Issues of what activities are funded are also in part the responsibility of community groups.
None of the MAP community initiatives stipulated the need to fund specific activities; thus if all the activities funded are for training purposes it is because of what community groups specified in their project proposals. The MAP was the first multilateral commitment to HIV/AIDS of its kind; thus in engendering mass community responses, a degree of training people with the means of educating, caring and addressing issues facing communities affected by HIV/AIDS is inevitable. A greater problem with funding is the absorptive capacity of community groups themselves. MAP representatives in Kenya and Tanzania stipulated that should the funds be disbursed effectively, further funding would be made available by the Bank (Harman, 2005s; Harman, 2005t; Harman, 2006m) . Issues with disbursement are part the problem of DAC infrastructure, but also part community group infrastructure.
The second issue is that of bureaucracy and transparency. A degree of bureaucracy is inevitable within a project the size of the MAP and its use of state agencies and structures as the main channels for CSO engagement. Comparatively, the MAP has faired better in community opinion than other programmes of a similar scale such as the Global Fund (Harman, 2005n; Harman, 2006a; Harman, 2006j) . A simple way of avoiding such bureaucracy would be to engage with fewer groups and focus on the national level alone, which would then undermine any form of community participation in the system. A further alternative would be to fund community groups directly with minimal state intervention.
However, the Bank is mandated to work in partnership with states. To work independently of states would undermine any long-term commitment to building infrastructure and the means to address the epidemic independent of foreign aid. The level of intricate problems associated with the MAP shows the ability of community groups to hold government agencies to account, and push for increased transparency, indicating the emergence of an effective civil society and fulfilling one of the MAP's central objectives.
World Bank Responses to Community Criticism
The Bank is fully aware of community perceptions and issues over funding, feedback and the capacity of the DACs. The changes it has made to the implementation structures of the MAP suggest that it is responsive to community needs and flexible with regard to state interests. The Bank interprets community awareness and complaints about the lack of funding as a good sign that communities are beginning to take ownership of the response and thus will incentivise the government to take action (Harman, 2005s) . TTL of the MAP in Uganda, Peter Okwero, emphasises that despite some of CSOs' misgivings concerning the community component of the MAP, the project has succeeded in motivating the community where other community focused projects have failed (Harman, 2005u) .
The NACs and the Bank have responded to the problems of the DACs in two distinct ways.
The first, in reference to the DACs in Kenya, was to dismantle the DACs and replace them The difficulties and complexities of community delivery are reflected in the role of the regional agents introduced within the MAP, whose ability to reach people affected by HIV/AIDS was limited by the following. First, an initial lack of institutional support from the DACs because of a discrepancy over their respective mandates which in turn led to further delay in reaching the community (Harman, 2006r; Harman, 2006s) . Second, because the lack of funding and human resources with the DACs, the RFAs had to spend much of their time training DAC staff (Harman, 2006l) . Third, delayed disbursement gave rise to the notion that the system of community delivery was not working, and frustrated community trust in the process. Compounding this distrust of the RFAs by both the DACs and the community was the fact that the idea for them did not stem from the community, but by the 
Conclusion
This paper has explored one of the main contentions within Goal 6 of the MDGs: the desire to channel resources and engage the opinions of those affected by HIV/AIDS as a means of combating the epidemic, and the problems associated with doing so. The paper has explored this issue by considering the central mechanisms of engagement used within the World Bank's MAP project and the institutional problems associated with it. In so doing, the paper raises several concerns as to how the MDGs promote and achieve well-being for people affected by HIV/AIDS in East Africa. First, community participation in Goal 6 of the MDGs is characterised by service delivery only. Select community groups are receiving funds, but much of the money directed to them is lost in the process, and once the money arrives, it is often too little, too late. Second, communities do not drive the agenda of Goal 6
with their ideas. The emphasis placed on funding as a means of engagement had bred increased competition and mistrust between various types of CSOs that compete for funds to maintain their relevance and influence within decision-making. This limits the formation of networks and collaborative mechanisms that increase communities' capacity and leverage in making Goal 6 accountable and responsive to their needs.
Third, the role of local government agencies as implementers of Goal 6 is central to understanding the problems and limitations of delivering resources to the community.
Community engagement does not occur between the local and global levels but is dependent on government agencies and their ability to internalise and promote the rhetoric of the MDGs. These government agencies are limited by a loose-mandate that has to manage the competing objectives of multiple donors instead of designing locally responsive policies independent of international priorities. In sum, the international cycle of minimal direct community engagement and institutional bottlenecks that has continued to limit poverty efforts continues within Goal 6: with community groups managing their situation, but in no way coping with it.
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